We study how the structure of social media networks a ects the degree of polarization in society. We analyze a dynamic model of opinion formation in which individuals have imperfect information about the true state of the world and su er from bounded rationality.
Introduction
The United States has experienced an unprecedented surge in political polarization over the last two decades. A recent survey conducted by The Pew Research Center indicates that Republicans and Democrats are further apart ideologically than at any point since 1994 (see Figure 1 ).
What could be causing this increase in polarization? Traditional theories in economics and political science point to the recent rise in income inequality, the in uence of PACs through cam- paign nancing, party sorting among voters, re-districting (Gerrymanding), and changes in the media environment as potential determinants (see Barber and McCarthy, 2015 for an excellent discussion). More recently, attention has focused on the internet as an alternative candidate explanation. Cass Sunstein (2002) argues that the internet creates 'echo chambers' where individuals nd their own biases and opinions endlessly reinforced, and writes that 'people restrict themselves to their own points of view-liberals watching and reading mostly or only liberals; moderates, moderates; conservatives, conservatives; Neo-Nazis, Neo-Nazis ' (p. 5-6) . This reduces the 'unplanned, unanticipated encounters central to democracy itself' and signi cantly increases polarization (p. 9).
According to a 2016 study by the Pew Research Center and the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, 62% of adults get their news from social media (a sharp increase from the 49% observed in 2012).
1 Among these, two-thirds of Facebook users (66%) get news on the site, nearly six-in-ten Twitter users (59%) get news on Twitter, and seven-in-ten Reddit users get news on that platform. With the dispersion of news through social media, and more generally the internet, and
given that a growing proportion of individuals, politicians, and media outlets are relying more intensively on this networked environment to get information and to spread their world-views, it is natural to ask whether and to what extent political polarization might be exacerbated by social media communication.
Another phenomena-of particular interest to the study of polarization-that became prevalent particularly around 2016 presidential election was the massive spread of fake news (also referred to as disinformation campaigns, cyber propaganda, cognitive hacking, and information warfare) through the internet. As de ned by Gu, Kropotov, and Yarochkin (2016) , 'Fake news is the promotion and propagation of news articles via social media. These articles are promoted in such a way that they appear to be spread by other users, as opposed to being paid-for advertising. The news stories distributed are designed to in uence or manipulate users' opinions on a certain topic towards certain objectives. ' While the concept of propaganda is not new, the arrival of the internet (particularly through social media) has made the spreading of ideas faster and more scalable, making it easier for propaganda material to reach a wider set of people. Relative to more traditional ways of spreading propaganda, fake news are extremely di cult to detect posing a challenge for social media users, moderators, and governmental agencies trying control their dissemination. A December 2016 Pew Research Center study found that 'about two-in-three U.S. adults (64%) say fabricated news stories cause a great deal of confusion about the basic facts of current issues and events. ' Moreover, 23% admit to having shared a made-up news story (knowingly or not) on social media. Understanding how fake news spread and a ect opinions in a networked environment is at the core of our work.
We study a dynamic model of opinion formation in the spirit of Jadbabaie, Molavi, Sandroni, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012, JMST henceforth) in which individuals who are connected in a social network have imperfect information about the true state of the world. The true state of the world can be interpreted as the relative quality of two candidates competing for o ce, the optimality of a speci c government policy or regulation (e.g. restrictions on immigration, imposition of tari s, mandatory vaccination, etc.), the degree of government intervention (through the provision of public goods such as healthcare or education), etc. Individuals can obtain information (e.g. signals) about the true state of the world from unbiased sources (scienti c studies, unbiased news media, reports from non-partisan research centers such as the CBO, etc.), but are unable process all the available information. They can also obtain information from their social neighbours (e.g. individuals connected to them through the network) who are potentially exposed to other sources.
Due to limited observability about the structure of the network and the probability distribution of signals observed by others, individuals would need to update opinions on the state of the world as well as on the topology of the network. This makes Bayesian updating complex and impractical. We assume instead that individuals su er from bounded rationality, and update their opinions partly based on information obtained from their social network in an inhomogeneous stochastic gossip model of communication based on JMST(2012) and Acemoglu, Como, Fagnati, and Ozdaglar (2013, ACFO henceforth) .
There are two types of individuals in this economy: regular agents and internet bots. Regular agents receive signals from unbiased sources and are also in uenced by the opinion of their social neighbours. Internet bots, on the other hand, ignore the opinion of others and have the ability to produce fake news. The opinions generated from the exchange of information forms a Markov process which never leads to consensus among regular agents. In such environment, it can be shown that society's beliefs fail to converge almost surely. Moreover, under some conditions, the belief pro le can uctuate in an ergodic fashion leading to polarization cycles.
The structure of the graph representing the social media network and the degree of in uence of bots in it shape the dynamics of opinion and the degree of polarization in the long-run.
More speci cally, long-run polarization depends on three factors: behavioral assumptions (e.g. the updating rule), communication technology (e.g. the speed at which information ows), and the network topology (e.g. the share of bots on the population, their centrality and ability to spread fake news, clustering among agents, etc.). Because a theoretical characterization of the relationship between the topology of the network and the degree of polarization is unfeasible, we simulate a large set of random networks with di erent characteristics. We then quantify how the degrees of centrality, connectedness, and in uence a ect long-run polarization, de ned as in Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban (2007) .
By connecting individuals through networks, social media provided a platform for individuals to share information in real time. On the ip side, it made it more di cult for them to assess the credibility of the content received allowing fake news to spread and contaminate the network.
From our simulations, we nd that to the extent that agents rely more heavily on the opinion of others (and less on incorporating signals from unbiased sources), polarization rises. The speed of communication, measured by the percentage of friends a given agent pays attention to at each point in time, reduces polarization, as agents are able to aggregate information even in the presence of bots. This is consistent with ndings by Barbera (2015) who documents that the expansion of Twitter resulted in lower political polarization. As expected, a larger number of bots increases polarization, and so does an increase in their ability to stream fake news. In terms of the e ects of network topology, we nd that a higher degree of centrality of bots (measured by in-degree or PageRank) exacerbates polarization. However, as the ability of a given bot to reach most of the network (measured by high in-closeness centrality) rises, polarization declines.
This happens because the internet bot is able to manipulate opinions more e ciently by pulling society's beliefs to one side of the political spectrum. Finally, we nd that networks with a high degree of clustering and reciprocity tend to exhibit lower polarization in the long run, as greater connectivity among agents facilitates consensus.
Related Literature Our paper is related to a growing number of articles studying information transmission in networks under both, bounded and fully rational agents.
The strand of the literature assuming that agents are fully rational typically considers a dynamic game where individuals interact sequentially and exchange opinions only once. Examples are Banerjee (1992), Smith and Sorensen (2000) , Banerjee and Fundenberg (2004), and Acemoglu et. al (2011) . Because the theoretical characterization of equilibria is complex, these papers restrict attention to very stylized networks. Moreover, they typically study environments in which society eventually reaches consensus, implying that polarization arises only in the short-run.
The strand of literature focusing on bounded rational agents (also referred to as 'De-Grootian') assumes that individuals follow simple heuristic rules to update beliefs. Examples are Ellison and Fundenberg (1993, 1995) , Bala and Goyal (1998 ,2001 ), De Marzo et al (2003 , Golub and Jackson (2010), and ACFO (2013) . In these environments, long-run polarization arises in equilibrium because individuals receive information only once-at the outset of the initial period. There is no sense in which new information (form unbiased sources) may arrive and modify regular agents'
opinions. JMST (2012) show that when this assumption is relaxed, that is, when individuals receive a constant ow of information, polarization eventually disappears. This occurs even though individuals are not fully Bayesian, but requires the network to be strongly connected (i.e. no internet bots are present).
In this paper, we consider simultaneously the possibility of learning from unbiased sources and being exposed to fake news spread by internet bots. As a result, our environment encompasses ACFO (2013) and JMST (2012) as special cases. We rst show that their results can be replicated by an appropriate choice of parameters. That is, we can show that by shutting down the degree of in uence of internet bots, regular agents eventually learn the truth. But if bots are in uential, social media communication is not e ective in aggregating information, and polarization persists in the long run. Our main contribution relative to the existing literature is that we simulate a large set of complex social networks and quantify the relative importance of behavioral assumptions, technological characteristics, and network topology on long-run polarization.
There is a growing empirical literature analyzing the e ects of social media in opinion formation and voting behavior (Halberstam and Knight, 2016) . Because individual opinions are unobservable from real network data, these papers typically use indirect measures of ideology to back-out characteristics of the network structure (such as homophily) potentially biasing their impact. By creating a large number arti cial networks, we can directly measure how homophily and other network characteristics a ect opinion. Finally, our paper complements the literature on the role of biased media such as Campante and Hojman (2013) , Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006 , and 2011 ), and Flaxman et al. (2013 and the e ects of social media on political polarization, such as Boxell et al (2017) , Barbera (2016) , and Weber at al (2013).
Baseline Model
Agents and Information Structure The economy is composed by a nite number of agents i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n} interacting through a social network. Individuals have imperfect information about the true state of the world θ belonging to a parameter space Θ = [0, 1] . This parameter can be interpreted as the relative quality of two candidates, L and R, competing for o ce. A value of θ = 0 would imply that candidate L is better suited for o ce, whereas θ = 1 would imply that R is more quali ed.
Each agent starts with a prior belief θ i,0 assumed to follow a Beta distribution,
This distribution or world-view is characterized by initial parameters α i,0 > 0 and β i,0 > 0. Note that individuals agree upon the parameter space Θ and the functional form of the probability distribution, but have di erent world-views as they disagree on α i,0 and β i,0 . Given prior beliefs, we de ne the initial opinion of agent i y i,0 about the true state of the world as her best guess of θ given the available information,
where Σ 0 = {α i,0 , β i,0 } denotes the information set available at time 0. At each point in time t ≥ 1 regular agent i obtains information from unbiased sources that are jointly informative about the true state of the world. We formalize the information obtained from unbiased sources as a draw s i,t from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter θ. The signal is unbiased, as it is centered around the true state of the world.
Social Network We assume that regular agents update their world-views and opinions based not only on private signals s i,t , but also through the in uence of individuals connected to them in a social network.
The connectivity among agents in the network at each point in time is described by a directed
where g t is a real-valued n × n adjacency matrix. Each regular element g t ij in the directed-graph represents the connection between agents i and j at time t. More precisely, g t ij = 1 if i is paying attention to (e.g. receiving information from) j, and 0 otherwise. Since the graph is directed, it is possible that some agents pay attention to (e.g. receive information from) others who are not necessarily paying attention to (e.g. obtaining information from) them, i.e. 
where the initial structure of the network, represented by the initial adjacency matrix g 0 , remains unchanged.
Example 2 (Bernoulli Clock). In this example we intend to illustrate the network dynamics. The gure in Panel 2a represents the original network and its adjacency matrix, whereas the gure in Panel 2b depicts a realization such that agent 1 does not pay attention to agents 2 and 4 in period 1.
Agents 2 and 3, on the other hand, pay attention to agent 1 in both periods.
3 The notation • denotes the Hadamard Product, or equivalently, the element-wise multiplication of the matrices. At the beginning of period t, a signal pro le is realized and the signal s i,t is privately observed by agent i.
Regular agents
After observing this signal from unbiased sources, regular agent i computes her Bayesian posterior conditional on s i,t . We assume that parameters α i,t+1 and β i,t+1 are convex combinations between her Bayesian posterior and the weighted average of the information obtained from her neighbors.
where
denotes the reliance weight given to unbiased sources and 1−b i,t captures the in uence of friends through social media. The parameter b i,t ∈ [0, 1] captures the attention span: a regular agent's full attention span is split between processing information from unbiased sources and that provided by their friends in the network (e.g. reading a Facebook or Twitter feed). Equation (4) speci es that if no friends are found in the neighborhood of agent i, then this agent attaches weight 1 to the signal received. Conversely, if at least one friend is found, this agent uses a common weight
represents the weight given to the information received from her out-neighbor j. When b i,t = 1 for some t agent i fully relies on her private signal behaving like a standard Bayesian agent. As b i,t approaches zero, she is more in uenceable by social media, as more weight is given to her friends' opinions.
Finally, note that this updating rule implies that the posterior distribution determining worldviews of agent i will also be a Beta distribution with parameters α i,t+1 and β i,t+1 . Hence, an agent's opinion regarding the true state of the world at t can be computed as
Our heuristic rule resembles the one in JMST (2012), but there are two important distinctions.
First, their adjacency matrix is xed over time, whereas ours is stochastic (an element we borrowed from ACFO, 2013). Second, we restrict attention to a speci c family of distributions (e.g.
Beta) and assume that individuals exchange parameters that characterize this distribution (e.g. α i,t and β i,t ). So the heuristic rule involves updating these parameters, whereas JMST (2012)'s heuristic rule involves a convex combination of the whole distribution. Given their rule, the posterior distribution may not belong to the same family as the prior distribution. That is not the case in our environment, as the posterior will also belong to the Beta distribution family.
Internet bots
We assume that there are two types of bots, L-bot and R-bot, with extreme views. Internet bot i disregards information from other agents in the network and has the ability to produce a stream of fake news κs
The parameter κ ∈ N + measures the ability of bots to produce more than one fake-news article per period, which can be interpreted as their ooding capacity (i.e. how fast they can produce fake news compared to the regular ow of informative signals received by agents). When bumping into a regular agent in the network, bots transmit the whole stream of information to the agent. Hence, a value of κ > 1 gives them more de-facto weight in the updating rule of agents, emphasizing their degree of in uence on the network. 4 To the extent that bots might be in uential, their presence in the network will be key for both, the existence and persistence of polarization over time. This is due to the fact that they will consistently communicate fake news (biased signals) to other agents in the network and are ultimately the underlying force that pushes agents to the extreme of the political spectrum. Note that bots share similar characteristics with the 'stubborn' agents in ACFO (2013).
Polarization and Network Structure
We base our notion of polarization on the seminal work by Esteban and Ray (1994) De nition 1 (Polarization). Polarization P t aggregates the degrees of 'identi cation' and 'alienation' across groups at each point in time.
4 Under this rule, we can model the bot update as
where a ∈ [0, 1.6] andỹ k,t is the average opinion of agents in group k and π k,t is the share of agents in group k at time t.
We are interested in understanding how the existence of bots and the structure of the network a ect the evolution of polarization.
Polarization without Internet Bots
The following two results show conditions under which polarization vanishes in the limit. The rst one is analogous to Sandroni et al (2012), whereas the second one extends it to a network with dynamic link formation as in Acemoglu et al (2010).
is strongly connected and if the directed links are activated every period (e.g., g t = g 0 ), all agents eventually learn the true θ
As a consequence, polarization converges to zero,
Proof. See Appendix A.
When the network is strongly connected all opinions and signals eventually travel through the network allowing agents to perfectly aggregate information. Note that strong connectedness precludes the existence of bots, as these agents do not internalize other people's opinions. The proposition shows that the society reaches consensus (e.g. there is no polarization) and uncovers the true state of the world, θ. We refer to this as a 'wise' society, as de ned below.
De nition 2 (Wise Society). We say that a society is wise if
The result in Proposition 1 is in line with the ndings in JMST (2012) despite the di erence in heuristic rules being used. Proposition 2 shows that the assumption of a xed listening matrix can be relaxed. In other words, even when g t is not constant, polarization vanishes in strongly connected networks. Proof. If perfect information aggregation is reached at any particular timet, then we know that y i,t = θ for all i ∈ G, thus all alienation terms in the polarization function are zero because |y i,t − y j,t | = |θ − θ| = 0, for all i and j in N . Therefore, Polarization Pt is zero for any particular choice of parameter a. Conversely, if polarization at timet is zero, then all alienation terms are necessarily zero, since the measure of groups is non-negative. This means that |y i,t − y j,t | = 0 implies y i,t = y j,t and, therefore, any opinion consensus of the form y i,t = y j,t =θ, such that θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1] andθ = θ, meets this requirement.
In other words, it is possible for a society to reach consensus (i.e. experience no polarization of opinions) to a value of θ that is incorrect. In order for a society to be polarized, individuals need to be exposed to bots with opposing views. Another noticeable characteristic of the evolution of P t over time is that rather than settling Finally, we want to point out that whether polarization increases, decreases, or uctuates over time depends importantly on the topology of the network, the number and degree of in uence of bots, the frequency of meetings between individuals (e.g. the clock) and the degree of rationality of agents. Figure 5 depicts the behavior of P t over time for a series of larger random networks (e.g. there are 100 nodes, an arbitrary number of bots, and di erent rationality levels). The next section is devoted to uncovering what drives these di erent dynamics.
Numerical Simulation
One of the biggest challenges when using network analysis is to ascertain analytical closed forms and tractability. The combinatorial nature of social networks that exhibit a high degree of heterogeneity makes them very complex objects, imposing a natural challenge for theoretical analysis.
In our work, limiting properties can be characterized only when we assume strong connectivity and absence of internet bots. As we drop these assumptions, we observe that di erent networks might experience di erent limiting polarization levels, even if departing from the very same initial level of polarization.
To understand such di erences, we resort to computer simulations where a large number of random networks is mainly generated according to a classical random graph model based on Barabasi and Albert (1999) . Besides emulating real-world networks characteristics, this model allow us to create a variety of initial networks with di erent characteristics (e.g. di erent degrees of in uence, etc) and learning standards (i.e., exposition to signals from unbiased sources and/or social media). The simulation exercise helps us to better understand the relative importance of the network topology and other social characteristics in driving polarization by producing enough variability in a controlled environment.
Network Topology: Augmented Barabasi-Albert Random Graph
Barabasi and Albert (1999) were mainly motivated by the emergence of the World Wide Web and the evolution of popularity of some web pages. They noted that popular web pages would show a tendency to get more popular over time. The popularity of web pages in this context refers to the number of other web pages pointing a direct link to them. This characteristic means that new entrant nodes (web pages) tend to link themselves to already existent nodes that are very well connected (popular web pages), indicating that the probability with which a new node connects to the existing nodes is not uniform. Contrarily, there is a higher probability that it will be linked to a node that already has a large number of connections. An implication of this characteristic is that a few nodes in the network are very well connected while most of the other nodes are not as well connected and "hubs" are formed.
In this context, Barabasi and Albert (1999) developed an algorithm to generate random networks with such characteristics using a process called preferential attachment. In this process, starting with a small number n 0 of nodes, at every time step a new node with m(≤ n 0 ) edges is added to the network. Thus, the new node links to m di erent nodes already present in the system. To incorporate preferential attachment, they assume that the probability Π that a new node will be connected to node i depends on the connectivity k i (in-degree, or the number of nodes pointing to them) of that node, so that Π =
After t periods, this protocol leads to a random network with t + n 0 nodes and mt edges. Figure 6 illustrates a random network generated following this procedure. In it, there is a small subset of agents in the center of the network with a relatively large audience. In our context, each node represents an agent. Individuals with a larger audience are more in uential. While this model allows us to introduce in uential agents, it rules out (i) reciprocity, i.e. the chance that nodes are both paying attention to each other; and (ii) heterogeneity in the degree centrality of agents, both key characteristics of social media interactions. To capture this, we augment the Barabasi-Albert algorithm to introduce di erent degrees of reciprocity through the heterogeneity of connections. To produce networks with such characteristics, we implement two extra routines, respectively: (i) similarly to the Erdos-Renyi random graph model, we x a set of nodesn ⊆ n in each simulation and assume that each link between two agents is formed with a given probability. The link formation is independent across links; and (ii) in each step, instead of allowing only a xed number m(≤ n 0 ) of links to be formed, the number of edges of an entrant node at any time t is given by the realization of a draw from a gamma distribution de ned over the potential number of edges to add in each time step. If this rule is not implemented, we would implicitly assume that every regular agent would be paying attention to exactly m(≤ n 0 ) agents. Figure 7 illustrates the network generated from the augmented model. In it, we can see that information ows in both directions (e.g. there is reciprocity) and that some agents are more in uential than others (e.g. there is preferential attachment). This procedure usually produces networks in which regular agents, i.e. all agents but bots, are not strongly connected. 5 We disregard from our analysis the few instances in which strong connectivity is observed among these agents.
In addition, we select one agent, uniformly at random among agents i ∈ N with |N
and |N out i (g 0 )| ≥ 1, to be a bot. After such node is transformed into a bot, we break its outlinks. We repeat this routine sequentially until the pre-determined number of bots is reached (see next subsection). By proceeding this way, we guarantee that the bot is not disconnected of the resulting network and that it can be located in any node that displays at least a minimal amount of followers. 
Generating the dataset
The set of networks constituting our arti cial dataset is created as follows. We x the number of agents (or nodes) n = 35 and the average degree of polarization P 0 across networks. We restrict attention to networks with a symmetric number of L-bots and R-bots, considering 1, 2, 3, or 4 bots of each type per network. Given these parameters, we draw a large number M = 5435 of initial random networks G 0 following our augmentation of the Barabasi-Albert model. We then assign initial conditions and other characteristics that vary across networks. More speci cally, we vary the speed of communication through the clock parameter ρ and the ooding parameter κ, the weight given to unbiased sources b, the location of bots in the network, the degree of initial homophily, clustering, and reciprocity as described in more detail below. This produces the basic structure for social communication and determines the initial dispersion of beliefs about θ.
Finally, we simulate social media communication for a large number of periods (T = 2000) given the network structure, and use the resulting opinions to compute the evolution of polarization.
Network Heterogeneity
For each network m, we x the initial distribution of opinions so that the same mass of the total population lies in the middle point of each one of 7 groups. This rule basically distributes our agents evenly over the political spectrum [0, 1] such that each of the 7 groups contains exactly 1 7
of the total mass of agents, as shown in Figure 9 . Moreover, we set the same variance for each agent world-view to be σ 2 = 0.03. With both opinion and variance, we are able to compute the initial parameter vector (α 0 , β 0 ). 6 Among the agents populating our network, a predetermined number of agents is chosen, uniformly at random among those with at least one individual in their in-neighborhood at t = 0, to be internet bots in each simulation. For symmetry, we simulate networks with the same number of bots of each type. 6 In this case, we only need to use the relationships µ = It is informative to analyze the variability in network characteristics arising from our random network generation exercise. Network characteristics can be split in three categories: behavioral, technological, and topological. The variability in the behavioral dimension is given by changes in the parameter b, capturing the degree to which agents rely more or less heavily on the opinion of others. Recall that a higher value of b gives more weight to the Bayesian posterior from unbiased signals. Table 1 shows that the parameter ranges between 0 (emulating De-Grootian agents) and 1 (emulating purely Bayesian agents), with an average value of b is 0.475 and a standard deviation of 0.319.
The two parameters capturing communication technology are ρ, which controls the speed at which links are activated and κ, which determines the ability of bots to ood the network with fake news. A higher value of ρ could be interpreted as higher speed of information ow, i.e. the easiness to access all friends opinions. We restrict this parameter to be strictly positive and no greater than 1. Given that it has been drawn from a uniform distribution, the average ρ in our sample is 0.52. A standard deviation of 0.275 ensures that there is signi cant variability in the arti cial dataset. The average number of signals sent by each bot in our sample is 7.4, with a minimum of one (which is the number of signals sent by regular agents per encounter) and a maximum of 20, indicating that bots can place fake news 20 times faster than an unbiased source of news per period. The main di erence between increasing κ vis-a-vis increasing the number of bots, is that the former keeps the location of bots in the network constant whereas the latter doesn't.
In terms of the network topology, of particular interest to us is the location of bots in the network, as this a ects their degree of in uence. The more central a bot is, the easier it is for it to spread fake news and manipulate regular agents' opinions. There are several ways in which centrality can be measured according to the literature. Degree is the simplest centrality measure, which consists on counting the number of neighbors an agent has. We focus on in-degree, de ned as the number of incoming links to a given bot (their out-degree is null by construction). This measure is normalized by the size of the network (minus 1),
The average in-degree in our sample is 0.14, indicating that bots of a given type are followed, on average, by 14% of regular agents. There is a large dispersion across networks, with cases in which bots are being followed by around 90% of agents in the network.
While this measure of in uence is intuitive, it is not necessarily the only way in which a bot can be e cient at manipulating opinion, and hence a ecting polarization. There are networks in which a bot has very few followers (and hence a low in-degree) but each of their followers is very in uential. If the bot manages to manipulate a regular agent who is itself very central, it may be able to a ect the opinion of others to a large extent. An alternative measure of centrality that incorporates these indirect e ects is Google's PageRank centrality.
7 PageRank tries to account not only by quantity (e.g. a node with more incoming links is more in uential) but also by quality (a node with a link from a node which is known to be very in uential is also in uential).
7 This measure is a variant of eigenvector centrality, also commonly used in network analysis.
Mathematically, the PageRank centrality P R i of a node i is represented by
where D out j is the out-degree of node j if such degree is positive and α is the damping factor, set to α = 0.85.
8 Note that the PageRank of bot i depends on the PageRank of its followers in the recursion above. Summary statistics for the average PageRank across bots of each type are shown in Table 1 . As this is a more sophisticated version of degree centrality, it's correlation with in-degree is high (about 0.8 in our sample).
An alternative measure of centrality is given by closeness centrality. This measure keeps track of how close a given bot is to each other node in the network. High proximity to all agents in the network makes the bot more e cient in spreading fake news, as they reach their targeted audience more quickly. To compute closeness, we rst measure the mean distance between the bot and every other agent in the network. De ne d ji as the length of the shortest path from regular agent j to bot i. 9 In-closeness centrality is de ned as the inverse of the mean distance d ji across regular agents to reach bot i, C Table 1 shows summary statistics for the in-closeness of each bot. It is worth noticing that even though in-degree and in-closeness are related measures of centrality, they capture slightly di erent concepts. A bot is central according to in-degree, because it has a large number of followers, whereas a bot is central according to in-closeness because it is easier for it to reach a large number of agents in the network. The correlation between these two variables is just 0.44. Moreover, there is disagreement between these two metrics when ranking the most in uential bot in some of our networks.
Finally, di erent than the measures of centrality computed for the set of agents, we present three network statistics we judge relevant for our analysis. For these network statistics, we use the subgraph of G 0 induced by the set of regular agents R = {i ∈ N :
all nodes, but bots. The reason we compute these statistics for this subgraph is because these measures would be under-reported if we had kept bots in the network. This is because bots do 8 The damping factor tries to mitigate two natural limitations of this centrality measure. First, an agent can get "stuck" at the nodes that have no outgoing links (bots) and, second, nodes with no incoming links are never visited. The value of 0.85 is standard in the literature. 9 In many networks sometimes one agent may nd more than one path to reach the bot. In such case, the shortest path is the minimum distance among all possible distances. not connect to any agent in the network. Moreover, any comparison across simulations could be harmed by the average connectivity of each bot, implying that we could lose some degree of comparability of simulations, particularly when changing the number of bots across networks.
The rst measure is reciprocity, which de nes the proportion of mutual connections in a network. A nodes pair (i, j) is said to be reciprocal if there are edges between them in both directions.
The reciprocity of a directed graph is the proportion of all possible pairs (i, j) which are reciprocal, provided there is at least one edge between i and j. In mathematical terms
Even though reciprocity is bounded between 0 and 1, it is possible to see that our data generation process only allow reciprocity to reach the maximum value of 0.257. This is mainly because we have not strongly connected networks and this measure could never reach 1 in our data. On average, this metric tells us that around 7% of the connections are mutual, with standard deviation of 4.3%.
Another important aspect of a social networks is how tightly clustered they are. Many empirical networks display an inherent tendency to form circles in which one's friends are friends with each other. In order to assess clustering in our directed networks, we use an extension to directed graphs of the clustering coe cient proposed by Fagiolo (2007) . This quantity is de ned as the average, over all nodes i, of the nodes-speci c clustering coe cients and is de ned as follows
where D tot i is the total degree, i.e. in-degree plus out-degree, of agent i. In our data, we observe an average clustering of 0.276, with standard deviation of 0.049.
Finally, many social networks exhibit a characteristic named homophily. This concept refers to the fact that people are more prone to maintain relationships with people who are similar to themselves. In our context, the level of initial homophily of opinions of agents is measured by an assortativity coe cient, as in Newman (2003), which takes positive values (maximum 1) if nodes with similar opinion tend to connect to each other, and negative (minimum −1) otherwise 10 .
Homophily is an important aspect of social networks since it might be related to the degree of political polarization. Our simulated societies display an average of homophily of −0.023, with standard deviation of 0.057.
Simulation
We x the true state of the world, θ = 0.5. For each network m, we draw a signal s m i,t for individual i ∈ N at time t ∈ T from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter θ = 0.5 for regular agents, or parameters θ L = 0 for L-bots and θ R = 1 for R-bots. We also draw the n × n matrix c t at each period t from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter ρ m , which determines the evolution of the network structure according to eq. (1). Together, the signals and the clock determine the evolution of world-views according to eqs. (2) and (3). Polarization P m,t is computed according to eq. (5) at each point in time, assuming a parameter a = 0.5. Our variable of interest is the level of polarization in the long-run,P m , which is normalized to belong to the interval [0, 1]. 11 This is de ned as the average value of P m,t for t larger than a thresholdt, which in our simulations is set to bet = 500. We chose this threshold because simulations converge after about 500 periods to an ergodic set (most statistics and results are unchanged when using the last 200 periods).
Mathematically, for each network m we computē
It is important to recall that this measure of polarization is computed from the limiting opinion of regular agents (that is, we do not consider the opinion of bots). This is done in order to allow a fair comparison of polarization levels across networks with di erent number of bots; if bots' opinions were included, we would mechanically rise polarization as we rise the number of bots.
The resulting sample consists of 5435 networks with associated observations for polarizationP m (where m indicates a particular network). About 91% of the sample exhibits positive polarization levelsP m > 0, while the remaining 9% is composed of networks in which agents have weight parameters b close to 1 (so their opinions eventually converge to the true state of the world implying thatP m = 0). Figure 10 depicts the distribution of polarization (conditioned on being positive) in our sample. There is a signi cant degree of variability in our sample, even though the polarization levels are relatively small, with mostP m observations lying below 0.5 (recall that maximum polarization has been normalized to 1 while the maximum polarization level in our sample is 0.63). The average value ofP m across networks is 0.113, with a standard deviation of 0.09. Interestingly, we also observe some mass near 0, indicating that agents reach quasi-consensus (e.g. disagreement is relatively small among regular agents) about θ in 3% of the networks. The distribution of opinions across networks that exhibit positive polarization (also computed over the last 500 periods) is shown in Figure 11 . Two remarks are in place. First, we see that the distribution centers around 0.5. This implies that there is a non-negligible set of networks in which individuals' opinions about the true state of the world are -on average-correct, even though there is some disagreement among regular agents. Second, there is a non-trivial amount of networks in which agents' opinions become extreme on average. This indicates that there are cases in which bots are successful at manipulating options towards their own, as even though there is some disagreement, average beliefs are centered around 0 or 1.
Regression Analysis
We are interested in estimating the e ect of network characteristics on long-run polarization. To assess the quantitative importance of each explanatory variable, we estimate the coe cients of an OLS model,P
where the m × 1 vectorP m denotes long-run polarization obtained from simulation m ∈ {1 . . . M }, X m denotes the matrix of network characteristics per simulation m, and m is the error term.
The set of explanatory variables in our benchmark speci cation is composed of the behavioral, technological, and topological characteristics of our networks listed in Table 1 . Estimated coe cients are reported in Table 2 . In the rst column, we consider the case in which each bot can send at most one message by restricting the sample to networks in which κ = 1. The negative coe cient on b implies that as regular agents place more weight on the unbiased signal (and less on the social media friends' opinions), polarization falls. In other words, agents are able to partially "mute" the network channel through which fake news permeate, facilitating information aggregation and reducing polarization as b raises. The overall e ect of a higher clock parameter ρ is a priori ambiguous:
on the one hand, it is more likely that a regular agent will (indirectly) incorporate fake news from those paying attention to the extreme views of bots as the speed of communication rises;
on the other hand, a faster ow of information makes it more likely to form consensus among regular agents. Under the current speci cation, we nd that the elasticity of polarization to the parameter ρ (evaluated at their average valuesρ andP m ) is ∂Pm ∂ρρ Pm = −0.37. This result suggests that the e ect of internalizing a larger number of opinions outweighs the e ect of higher fake news exposure.
As the degree of in uence of bots-proxied by their in-degree-rises, polarization is exacerbated. This follows from the the positive and signi cant coe cient on degree centrality, reported only for the R-bot (the L-bot is basically identical due to symmetry). The elasticity of polarization to the number of followers, computed at their mean values is ∂Pm ∂D inD in Pm = 0.17. It is also interesting to note that as the percentage of individuals following both bots, A LR rises, polarization increases as well. This happens because only a subset of all the notes in a given agents' in-neighborhood are activated at each point in time. In a relatively small network, this means that individuals will be exposed at opposing extreme views over time causing uctuations in their beliefs. 12 The coefcient of in-closeness is insigni cant in this speci cation, a result that is not robust to networks in which bots can send more than one message. Reciprocity decreases polarization, as expected from that fact that it facilitates consensus between any two agents exchanging information.
The negative coe cient on clustering suggests that the implied higher connectivity reached with higher clustering countervails the bias reinforcement associated with echo-chambers (Sunstein 2002 (Sunstein , 2009 . The e ects of initial homophily on polarization vanish over time, as seen by the fact that the coe cient is statistically insigni cant. As expected, as we increase the percentage of bots in the population, polarization among regular agents raises.
In Speci cation (2), we also consider networks in which bots can send multiple fake-news articles each period (e.g. by allowing κ > 1). The number observations raises signi cantly (from 752 to 4816) as we consider values of κ ∈ {1, ..., 8, 10, 15, 20}. We control for this greater ability to spread fake-news by introducing a set of dummy variables I(κ), one for each κ in the regression equation (with the exception of κ = 1, which is the reference value). To ease readability, we plot the resulting coe cients in Figure (12) .
12 A discussion of the determinants of polarization cycles is deferred to future work. As evident from the graph, all coe cients are positive, indicating a greater ability to spread fake news by each bot, keeping everything else constant, results in greater polarization levels.
It is worth noting that all coe cients are signi cant with p-values lower than 1%. In addition, note that the larger e ects on polarization are observed for relatively small values of κ, with the e ects remaining more or less stable for κ > 6. This suggests decreasing marginal returns to the introduction of fake-news on polarization levels (although the returns on tilting opinions could well be increasing).
The e ects of bayes, clock, homophily, in-degree, and clustering are basically unchanged once the full set of κs is included. One important di erence relative to the rst speci cation arises on the signi cance of the in-closeness coe cient. Interestingly, higher centrality as measured by in-closeness dampens polarization, as suggested by the negative sign of the estimated coe cient.
We interpret this as suggesting that the speed at which each given piece of fake-news travels through the network allows the bot to e ectively manipulate opinions pulling individuals towards their preferred point. Note that this is very di erent from the e ect of in-degree: a larger number of followers increases polarization whereas greater proximity to most agents in the network decreases it. A second di erence between this speci cation and the previous one is that the e ect of the number of bots is smaller. This is intuitive, as each bot is now able to send several messages, so the marginal e ect of a given bot is now lower.
Robustness
In this sub-section, we would like to study the robustness of the results presented so far.
PageRank: We rst investigate whether the e ects of centrality are robust to our measure of degree centrality. In Speci cation (3) of Table 2 , we replace in-Degree by PageRank as an explanatory variable and instead of considering the % of followers to both, we use the page rank of agents connected to both bots in t = 0. The basic message remains unchanged: the more in uential the bot is, the greater the polarization it introduces when spreading fake news. The size of the coe cient is signi cantly larger, but the elasticity is about the same (0.13 under this speci cation versus 0.17 in the previous one). The magnitude of the estimated coe cients of all other explanatory variables are basically unchanged, indicating that the results are robust to alternative degree centrality measures. The goodness of t decreases slightly from 0.55 in Speci cation (1) to 0.53 in Speci cation (2).
In Speci cation (4) we include, in addition to all the regressors from Speci cation (3), the page rank of individuals in the in-degree of each bot. The coe cient is positive and signi cant,
suggesting that a bot with low page-rank can still a ect polarization if the average page-rank of regular agents connected to it is large.
Bot Asymmetry: The previous speci cation studied the e ects of network characteristics on polarization considering the centrality of each bot separately. In this sub-section, we want to consider the e ects of their relative centrality. To that end, we construct two auxiliary variables.
The rst one is the Relative PageRank, de ned as the absolute di erence in the page rank of L-bot and R-bots
The second one is Relative in-Closeness, de ned in a similar way, as the absolute di erence in the in-closeness measure of the two types of bot. Using a speci cation similar to (3), in which individual PageRank and in-Closeness are substituted by relative ones, we nd that the coe cient on relative page rank is statistically insigni cant. That is, polarization is unresponsive to increases in the relative number of followers of a given bot. The coe cient of relative in-closeness is negative. This suggests that as a bot gets relatively closer to the rest of the network, he becomes more e cient at spreading fake-news decreasing polarization levels. Results are omitted due to space constraints but are available upon request.
True State: Here, we study whether assuming θ = 0.5 has consequences for the size or sign of estimated coe cients. To that end, we simulate an additional 4317 networks using the same procedure as before, but assuming that the true state of the world is θ = 0.7 instead. The rst column of Table 3 replicates the results from Speci cation (3) above (e.g. when theta = 0.5) whereas the second column displays the result for the sample where θ = 0.7. The only signi cant di erence is on the magnitude of coe cient on PageRank of the R-bot, which is now smaller (this is robust to excluding the page rank R-bot's audience for the regression equation). Overall, the results presented in the benchmark case are robust to having one bot's messages being closer to the true state of the world (i.e. news being less fake).
Network Size: Finally, we wanted to analyze the e ects of network size on our results. We run an additional 1501 simulations using the same procedure but considering twice the number of nodes, n = 70. We reduced the set of κ to {1, 5, 10, 15, 20} and the number of fanatics of each type to 1, 2, and 3. Summary statistics for the dataset with large networks can be found in Table   5 at Appendix C. Average polarization declines fromP m = 0.12 when n = 35 (and the number of fanatics and κ are restricted to the sets above) toP m = 0.09 when n = 70.
We estimate speci cations (2) and (3) from Table 2 for small (n = 35) and large (n = 70) networks. The resulting coe cients are displayed in Table 4 . Note that the sample size for small networks is smaller than in our benchmark case due to the fact that we restricted attention to networks with comparable κ and number of fanatics to the ones in large networks. The e ects of the weighting parameter b and the clock ρ on polarization are the same regardless of network size. Interestingly, the e ects of in-degree decrease sharply whereas the e ects of in-closeness increase signi cantly when we move from n = 35 to n = 70. This implies that having a larger set of followers is less important in driving polarization when networks are large.
Being closer to most followers by one unit, on the other hand, proves more important in manipulating opinions when n = 70. Another characteristic that gains importance in large networks is the degree of reciprocity, which also becomes more relevant in reducing polarization when networks are large. These are not the result of di erences in network characteristics, as the elasticities of reciprocity and in-closeness are more negative when n = 70 than when n = 35. An important assumption is that the links in the network evolve stochastically. It would be interesting to extend the model to consider a case in which links are endogenously determined.
This could achieved by allowing agents to place a higher weight on individuals who share similar priors. In addition, they could choose to 'unfollow' (e.g. break links) agents who have views which are relatively far from their own.
Having identi ed the main determinants of polarization, it would be interesting to parameterize a real-life social media network (e.g. calibrate it) in order to back out the amount of fake news necessary to produce the observed increase in polarization between two periods of time. It would also be possible to carry forward a key-player analysis on the location of internet bots to better understand what is the most e cient way to reduce polarization.
closeness is −0.22 for small networks and −0.31 for large networks. Lemma 1. The matrix W t = B t + (I n − B t )ĝ t is row-stochastic in any period t, where
Proof. It is su cient to show that W t 1 1 1 = B t 1 1 1 + (I n − B t )ĝ t 1 1 1 = 1 1 1. For that we can show that the vector W t 1 1 1, for every t, has all entries equal to 
Λv, where Λ = diag(λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ n ) is the squared matrix with eigenvalues on its diagonal, ranked in terms of absolute values. More genreally, for any time τ we write
Noting that v −1 has ones in all entries of its rst column, it follows that
for each r, where λ r is the r-th largest eigenvalue of W . Therefore,
each row of W τ for all τ ≥τ converge to D D D, which coincides with the stationary distribution.
Moreover, if the eigenvalues are ordered the way we have assumed, then
i.e. the convergence rate will be dictated by the second largest eigenvalue, as the others converge to zero more quickly as τ grows.
With these two auxiliary lemmas, we start by considering the parameter update process described in the Section (XX). Since the network's edges are activated every single period,ĝ t =ĝ and B t = B n×n = B = diag (b, b, . . . , b) , where b ∈ [0, 1], since j g t ij = 0 for any i and t. Thus, the update process for the parameter-vector α of size n is α t+1 = B(α t + s t+1 ) + (I n − B)ĝα t = [B + (I n − B)ĝ] α t + Bs t+1 .
We de ne the matrix inside the squared bracket as W for any t. We re-write the update process above as follows α t+1 = W α t + Bs t+1
When t = 0, So on and so forth, resulting in the following expression for any particular period τ
Similarly for the parameter β, we have
where 1 is the vector of ones of size n. From Equations (6) and (7), the sum of this two parameter-vectors is given by the following expression
Therefore, at any point in time τ , the opinion of any agent i is given by y i,τ = α i,τ α i,τ + β i,τ . From equation (6) 
where the symbol W 
From Equation (10), we have that the limiting opinion (in probability) of any agent i, at any point in time τ , is described as 
From Lemma 2, we can split the series in Equation (12) into two parts. The rst term describes a series ofτ terms that represent the "most recent" signals coming in to the network. Notice that every weight-matrix W t in the interval from t = 0 to t =τ is di erent from one another, since the matrix W t does not converge to a row-stochastic matrix with unity rank for low t. It is straight-forward to see that this term converges to zero as τ → ∞. The second term represents describes a series of τ −τ terms that represent the"older signals" that entered in the network and fully reached all agents. As τ → ∞, this term becomes a series with in nite terms. From the i. 
where W W W = D1 D1 D1 . From equation (12), we conclude that society is wise and because of that, plim t→∞ |ỹ k,t −ỹ l,t | = 0, i.e. the K groups reach consensus, impliying plim t→∞ P t = |θ * −θ * | = 0.
(Q.E.D.)
B Proof of Proposition 2
Consider again the update process described in the Section (XX) α t+1 = B t (α t + s t+1 ) + (I n − B t )ĝ t α t = [B t + (I n − B t )ĝ t ] α t + B t s t+1 .
Notice that B t is not xed over time now. We re-write the stochastic matrix (see lemma 1)
inside the squared bracket as α t+1 = W t α t + B t s t+1 .
When t = 0, α 1 = W 0 α 0 + B 0 s 1 . So on and so forth and similarly for the parameter vector β.
Following Chaterjee and Seneta (1977) , Seneta (2006) and Tahbaz-Salehi and Jadbabaie (2008), we let {W k }, for k ≥ 0, be a xed sequence of stochastic matrices (see lemma 1), and let U r,k be the stochastic matrix de ned by the following backward product
where W k = {w ij (k)}, U r,k = {u (r,k) ij } 15 .
The inequality above shows that for any h and k ≥τ By setting i = h, it is clear that u k,r i,s is a Cauchy sequence that aproaches a limit as k → ∞.
De nition 3. The scalar function µ(·) continuous on the set of n × n stochastic matrices W and satisfying 0 ≤ µ(W ) ≤ 1 is called a coe cient of ergodicity. It is said to be proper if µ(W ) = 1 ⇔ W = 1v 1v 1v , where v v v is any probability vector (i.e. whenever W is a row-stochastic matrix with unity rank).
In particular, we will focus on the proper coe cient of ergodicity µ(W ) = 1 − a(W ), where
|w is − w js |. Therefore, weak ergodicity is then equivalent to µ(U r,k ) → 1 as k → ∞ and r ≥ 0. Proof. Soon C Summary statistics for big networks 
